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nAbstract With the wide spread use of e-transactions in enterprises, information
security risk management (ISRM) is becoming essential for establishing a safe
environment for their activities. This paper is concerned with presenting a com-
prehensive ISRM framework that enables the effective establishment of the tar-
get safe environment. The framework has two structural dimensions; and two
procedural dimensions. The structural dimensions include: ISRM ‘‘scope’’ and
ISRM ‘‘assessment criteria’’, while the procedural dimensions include: ISRM
‘‘process’’ and ISRM ‘‘assessment tools’’. The framework uses the comprehen-
sive STOPE (strategy, technology, organization, people, and environment) view
for the ISRM scope; while its assessment criteria is considered to be open to var-
ious standards. For the procedural dimensions, the framework uses the widely
known six-sigma DMAIC (deﬁne, measure, analyze, improve, and control) cycle
for the ISRM process; and it considers the use of various assessment tools. It is
hoped that the framework would be widely used in the future as an open refer-
ence for ISRM.
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One of the essential functions of information technology (IT) governance is risk
management, which aims at providing a safe environment for e-business and e-
commerce. In support of this function, various IT organizations, concerned with
standards have published different risk management methods. These methods
have been and are being partially or fully adopted by enterprises using IT, and
working in different ﬁelds, for identifying, analyzing, and minimizing risks for
their IT activities.
It would have been more convenient for such enterprises if a comprehensive
method that accommodates the various requirements of these methods, in a well
designed and enhanced manner, is available. This would support risk management
compatibility among enterprises, using IT, providing a common and safe environ-
ment for their e-business interaction.
This paper is concerned with introducing a comprehensive information security
risk management (ISRM) framework for enterprises using IT. The structural scope
of the framework is based on the STOPE (strategy, technology, organization, peo-
ple, and environment) view which is becoming of increasing importance for struc-
turing information security issues over its ﬁve distinct domains (Saleh et al., 2006,
2007, 2008; Esteves and Joseph, 2008); and the management process of the frame-
work is associated with well known six sigma DMAIC (deﬁne, measure, analyze,
improve, and control) cyclic phases (Pyzdek, 2003). In addition, the framework
adds management criteria to its structural issues; and considers evaluation tools
for its procedural phases. The framework also enables the integration and enhance-
ment of the various available risk management methods and standards into its
structural and procedural components. The paper describes the framework, and
emphasizes its importance as a potential open reference for enterprise ISRM.
2. Related work
Nowadays, there are number of different types of risk management methodolo-
gies, some of them issued by national and international organizations (ISO/IEC
TR 13335, 1998; NIST SP800-30, 2002; AS/NZS 4360, 2004; HB231, 2004; BSI
Standard 100-3, 2005; ISO/IEC 27005, 2008), others issued by professional orga-
nizations (CRAMM, 2001; CORAS, 2003; OCTAVE, 2005; Magerit, 2006;
Microsoft, 2006; Mehari, 2007) and the rest presented by research projects (Kailay
and Jarratt, 1995; Smith and Eloff, 2002; Robert and Rolf, 2003; Karabacak and
Sogukpinar, 2005; Hoffanvik and Stolen, 2006; Mayer et al., 2007). Each of these
methods has been developed to meet a particular need and hence has a different
objectives, steps, structure, and level of application. The common goal of these
methods is to prioritize and estimate the risk value and to suggest the most suitable
mitigation plan to eliminate or minimize that risk to an acceptable level (Vorster
and Labuschagne, 2005).
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methods, various reports, surveys, and related literature indicate that the diffusion
of the current risk management methods, within organizations has been very lim-
ited so far due to lack of awareness, high cost, need for expertise, and long process
(NCC, 2000; DTI, 2002). In addition, the trust in these methods is very low due to
the poor results, bulky confused reports and the narrow technological scope
(Labushehagne and Eloff, 1998; Spears, 2006). Furthermore, the confused huge
number of risk management methods (more than 200 now) create a problem to
any organization willing to adopt one of these methods and the absent of an
agreed reference benchmark or comparative framework for evaluating these meth-
ods limit its practical use in assessing the enterprises information security risks
(Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005; Bornman and Labuschagne, 2006; Syalim et
al., 2009).
Labuschagne and Eloff (1998) argues that most of the available risk manage-
ment methods have a scientiﬁc core that emerged from the engineering origins
of computing. These traditional methods used to manage enterprises risk and gen-
erally focused on the technology and this proposes technical solutions. The major-
ity of these methods seldom consider human, organizational, strategic, or
environmental factors. While technology is a necessary consideration, it is not
the only element requiring recognition (Hang et al., 2008; Werlinger et al.,
2009). In addition, the IT-centric approach to security risk analysis does not in-
volve business users to the extent necessary to identify a comprehensive set of risks
or to promote security awareness throughout the organization (Lategan and
Solms, 2006). Nosworthy (2000) mentioned that in order to apply business conti-
nuity measures in a consistent, manageable and cost effective manner an organi-
zation-wide approach to a practical business continuity risk analysis should be
adopted and applied to the business as a whole and not just the IT department.
Recently, many authors suggest the need for a holistic information security risk
management method that minimizes the several shortcomings of the traditional
risk management methods (Niekerk and Labuschagne, 2006; Spears, 2006; Zucca-
to, 2006; Anderson, 2007; Huang et al., 2008). The suggested method should be
based on the standards and considers the special characteristics of information
security domain and uses different techniques to combine the standard and profes-
sional methods under a comprehensive and practical information security risk
management framework (Jung et al., 1999).
3. The target enterprise ISRM framework
The target ISRM framework has two main parts: one part is concerned with its
structural view; while the other is associated with its procedural view. The struc-
tural view has two dimensions: scope and criteria; while the procedural view also
has two other dimensions: process and tools. The framework is described in the
following, in terms of these four dimensions.
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Figure 1 The structure of the proposed enterprise ISRM framework.
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technology, organization, people, and environment with different levels of
details, associated with each domain.
 The management ‘‘criteria’’ of the framework is considered to be associated
with the controls of the ISO family of information security standards. However,
other requirements can also be considered.
 The ‘‘process’’ of the framework adopts the ﬁve cyclic phases of six-sigma model
DMAIC: deﬁne, measure, analyze, improve, and control.
 The support ‘‘tools’’ of the framework may include the various means that
would promote the work, including: survey tools, mathematical models, and
computer software.
Fig. 1 illustrates the structure of the proposed framework. Further explanations
of both its structural view and procedural view are to follow.
3.1. The structural view of the framework
The structural view of the proposed ISRM framework is described here in terms of
its two dimensions: the STOPE-based scope, and the management criteria.
The STOPE-based scope of the framework would enable mapping the basic ele-
ments of the enterprise, associate with IT, to the domains of ‘‘strategy, technology,
organization, people, and environment’’. The basic elements of an enterprise, with
Table 1 Enterprise assets considered by different references (ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1998; CRAMM, 2001)
mapped on the STOPE domains.
STOPE Assets main groups
Tangible (Examples) Intangible
S Information: (Policy document) – Goodwill
– Service to clients
– Public conﬁdence
– Public trust
– Competitive advantage
– Image of the organization
– Reputation
– Trust in services
– Employee moral
– Productivity
– Loyalty
– Ethics
T Information: (Data ﬁles)
IT services: (Messaging-active directory)
Software: System (Solaris), Application (Oracle),
Utilities (management tools)
Hardware: Hosts (Servers) other (Printers)
Communication: Network (Routers), (Cable)
O Documents: (Management commitment)
Agreements: (Conﬁdentiality-third party)
Information: (Research)
Other: (User manuals-training material)
P IT staﬀ: (IT security manager)
Employee: (Senior management)
Users: (Inside/Outside)
Contractors:(Consultants)
Owners:(Stakeholders)
E Services: (Heating-lighting-power-AC)
Equipment: (Desks-Fax machines-Cables)
Physical (infrastructure): (Oﬃces-facilities)
A new comprehensive framework for enterprise information security risk management 111regards to ISRM, are considered to be its: assets, security challenges, and security
controls. These are addressed in the following according to the STOPE-based scope.
‘‘Asset management’’ is one of the main clauses of ISO 17799, and has two
objectives: ‘‘responsibility of assets’’ and ‘‘information classiﬁcation’’. ISO deﬁnes
an asset ‘‘as anything that has value to the organization’’ (ISO/IEC 17799, 2005).
This deﬁnition brings up the consideration of two types of assets: ‘‘tangible’’
and ‘‘intangible’’. Table 1 maps the tangible assets considered by different refer-
ences to the ﬁve STOPE domains; this is a high-level mapping that can be reﬁned
into sub-levels of further details. The Table also considers intangible assets that
are associated with multiple-domains.
Security challenges can be viewed as negative coins of two faces: threats and vul-
nerabilities. ISO deﬁnes threat as ‘‘a potential cause of an unwanted incident, which
may result in harm to a system or organization’’; and it deﬁnes vulnerability as ‘‘a
weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be exploited by one or more threats’’
(ISO/IEC 17799, 2005). Table 2 maps ISO threats and vulnerabilities to the ﬁve
STOPE domains. With regards to threats, the Table marks them as either: delib-
erate (D), accidental (A), or both (D&A).
Security controls are deﬁned by ISO as ‘‘means of managing risk, including pol-
icies, procedures, guidelines, practices, or organizational structures, which can be
of administrative, technical, management, or legal nature’’. Table 3 maps ISO
information security clauses, objectives and controls (ISO/IEC 17799, 2005) to
the ﬁve STOPE domains.
Table 2 Threats and vulnerabilities considered by different references (ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1998; CRAMM,
2001) mapped on the STOPE domains.
STOPE Challenges main groups
Threats Vulnerabilities
S Policy:(inadequate)
T Malicious codes: (Viruses) D Software: (Conﬁguration errors)
Software: (Failures) D&A Hardware: (Missing patches)
Hardware: (Failures) D&A Communication: (Unnecessary protocol)
Communication: (Inﬁltration) D Media: (Electrical interference)
O Agreement: (Inadequate) D Document: (No care at disposal)
Information: (Errors) D
Planning: (Problems) D Procedures: (Violations not reported)
Procedures: (Incorrect) D&A
P Employee: (Sabotage) D Employee: (Insuﬃcient training)
Users: (Inside/Outside/Theft) D
Crackers: (Malicious hacking) D
E Industrial: (Espionage) D Natural: (Facility in ﬂood zone)
Natural: (Earthquake) A Physical: (Unlocked doors)
Services: (Power outage) A
Table 3 ISO information security clauses, objectives and controls (ISO/IEC 17799, 2005) mapped on the
STOPE domains.
STOPE ISO 17799: 2005 BASIC PARTS
Part No. Clause No. of
objectives/
controls/factors
S 5 Security policy 1 2 15
T 10 Communications and operations management 10 32 188
11 Access control 7 25 120
12 Information systems acquisition, development, and maintenance 6 16 96
O 6 Organization of information security 2 11 82
7 Asset management 2 5 7
13 Information security incident management 2 5 13
14 Business continuity management 1 5 33
P 8 Human resources security 3 9 30
E 9 Physical and environmental security 2 13 59
15 Compliance 3 10 39
Total objectives, controls, and measures 39 133 682
112 M.S. Saleh, A. AlfantookhThe controls of ISO 17799 information security management standards have
been previously investigated according to the STOPE view, for the purpose of eas-
ing their application to enterprises, and achieving safe IT activities (Saleh et al.,
2006, 2007).
It should be noted that the framework would not be limited to the issues of the
assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and controls considered above, but it would also be
open to other potential issues.
The management criteria of the structural view would appear at all domains of
the STOPE-scope of the proposed framework. The criteria may specify the
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analysis. For the controls considered, it may provide benchmarks to their accept-
able levels. In general, the management criteria would be associated with the strat-
egy and requirements of the enterprise considered.3.2. The procedural view
The procedural view of the proposed ISRM framework is described here in terms
of its two dimensions: the six-sigma-based process and the support tools.
The six-sigma based process has the ﬁve-phase cyclic process of deﬁne, measure,
analyze, improve, and control: DMAIC In the following, the processes of the risk
management methods of the standards organizations and of the professional com-
panies given above are mapped on the phases of the DMAIC process. Each of
these phases is then addressed in terms of its objective, input and output.
Table 4 maps the processes of the key risk management methods, considered
above, to the six-sigma cyclic phases of: ‘‘deﬁne, measure, analyze, improve,
and control’’. This shows how the DMAIC process can accommodate these pro-
cesses, providing a potential comprehensive risk management process for the fu-
ture. This is enhanced further by giving the functions of each phase, in the
process, as summarized in Table 5, and explained in the following.
The ‘‘deﬁne’’ phase speciﬁes the basic elements of the risk management process.
This phase would use the output of a previous cycle of the DMAIC process, or
start a new process, depending on the case considered. This phase has a number
steps as follows:
 establish the context of the reviewed area;
 map the existing situation of the enterprise (assets, threats, vulnerabilities, con-
trols) to the STOPE domains;
 specify the owner of each asset;
 specify the location of each asset;
 specify the source of the threat;
 deﬁne the level of detail; and
 give security requirements.
The output of this phase would be a STOPE view of the current state of the ba-
sic elements of information security in the considered enterprise.
The ‘‘measure’’ phase assess the basic elements of the framework according to a
speciﬁed criteria. It receives the output of the ‘‘deﬁne’’ phase and add the follow-
ing information to each element:
 assessment of the current state of assets;
 assessment of the current state of threats;
 assessment of the current state of vulnerabilities; and
 assessment of the current state of controls.
Table 4 Mapping the processes of key risk management methods to the adopted DMAIC phases of the six-sigma.
Six-Sigma Key risk management methods
AS/NZS: 4360 ISO/IEC TR 13335-3 NIST 800-30 OCTAVE CRAMM Microsoft
Deﬁne Communicate and
consult
Risk analysis System characterizations Knowledge of
management–operational
area–staﬀ
Asset identiﬁcation
Establish the context Create threat proﬁle
Measure Identify risks Threat identiﬁcation Identify key components Asset valuation
Vulnerability
identiﬁcation
Evaluate selected
components
Threat and vulnerability
assessment
Analyze Analyze risk Control analysis Assessing risk
Likelihood determination
Evaluate risk Impact analysis
Risk determination
Improve Treat risk Safeguards selection Recommended controls Develop protection
strategy
Countermeasure selection
and recommendation
Conducting decision
supportPolicy and plan
implementation
Risk assessment report
Cost-beneﬁt analysis and
selection of controls
Implement controls
Implementation
Control Monitor and
review
Follow-up Test and evaluate Measuring risk
management program
eﬀectiveness
1
1
4
M
.S
.
S
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Table 5 The use of six-sigma ﬁve phase cyclic process DMAIC for ISRM.
DMAIC Explanation Output
Deﬁne Objective: Specify current state enterprise IS A STOPE view of the current
state of the basic elements of
information security in the
considered enterprise
Input: Collect information about enterprise basic elements
Assets Tangible/intangible/owner/location
Threats Deliberate/accidental
Vulnerabilities Technical/organizational
Controls Existing/planned
Measure Objective: Assess the current state of information security A STOPE view of the critical
assets, associated with the
assessment of the threats
& vulnerabilities they are
facing, and with the security
controls used
Input: Deﬁne stage outputs/expert or owner view
Assets Valuation (direct/indirect)
Threats/assets Possible damage
Vulnerability/asset Weakness in the security measures
Controls / assets STOPE/ISO based evaluation approach
for control analysis
(Saleh et al., 2007)
Assets requirements Conﬁdentiality/availability/integrity
Analyze Objective: Find the gap between the current state and the
required state of protection
A STOPE view of the gap
between security requirements
and the current state of
security, considering all critical
assets
Input: Assessment of enterprise current state from ‘‘measure’’
phase; and ‘‘required security
protection criteria
Model Development of an analytical model
for gap analysis
Evaluation Using the model to evaluate current state
of security versus required one
Gap Determination of the security gap that needs
to be closed, so that the
required improvement is achieved
Improve Objective: Specify required improvements
to close the gap between
the current state and
required state
A STOPE view of a plan of
action of what should be done
to close the gap and achieve
the required security
Input: Required state and current state
Directions Development of directions to close the
security gap and achieve the
required improvement
Plan Designing an action plan that follows
the directions
Control Objective: Implement improvement, monitor and evaluate;
repeat process.
Implementation of the plan,
operation, performance,
process activationInput: Action plan for improvement
Implementing The action plan for improvement
Monitoring The changing state
Documentation Documenting the work
Re-initiating The DMAIC process
A new comprehensive framework for enterprise information security risk management 115The output of this phase would be a STOPE view of the critical assets, associ-
ated with the assessment of the threats and vulnerabilities they are facing, and with
the security controls used.
The ‘‘analyze’’ phase analyzes the gap between the current state and the required
state of protection from challenges. This will be based on the output of the
116 M.S. Saleh, A. Alfantookh‘‘measure’’ phase on the one hand, and on required ‘‘criteria’’ on the other. The
basic steps of this phase are as follows:
 development of an analytical model for gap analysis;
 using the model for the evaluation of the current state versus the required state;
and
 determination of the security gap between the current state and the required state.
The output of the phase is a STOPE view of the gap between security require-
ments and the current state of security, considering all critical assets.
The ‘‘improve’’ phase considers the security state and the required state. It has
the following main steps:
 development of directions to close the security gap and achieve the required
improvement; and
 designing an action plan that follows the directions.
The output of the phase is a STOPE view of a plan of action of what should be
done to close the gap and achieve the required security improvement.
The ‘‘control’’ phase considers the improvement plan and performs the following
main steps:
 implementation of the plan;
 monitoring the changing state; and
 documenting the work.
The output of the phase is an improved security, in addition to going into an-
other cycle for responding to new requirements and change.
3.3. Support tools
The proposed framework considers that ‘‘support tools’’ would be required for the
executionof thevariousDMAICphases.Suchtoolshavealsobeenconsideredbypre-
vious methods (Saleh and Bakry, 2008). The tools would include, but not limited to:
 information collection and survey tools;
 modeling and mathematical tools;
 computational methods and software packages; and
 other related or combined tools.
4. Conclusions
This paper has presented a new enterprise ISRM framework that enjoys attractive
features for future use. The ‘‘STOPE-scope’’ of the framework enables it to
accommodate the wide range of issues associated with ISRM, in a well structured
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ered by other methods, but also permits other or emerging issues to be considered.
The six-sigma ‘‘DMAIC process’’ of the framework allows it to accommodate the
various processes of other ISRM methods in a one uniﬁed and widely accepted
process. In addition, the framework respond to the need of using a ‘‘management
criteria’’, and permits various criterion to be taken into account, including ISO
information security controls, and considering pre-determined benchmarks. The
framework also considers the use of ‘‘support tools’’ for performing the various
phases of the process efﬁciently as is the case with other ISMR methods. The com-
prehensive and ﬂexible nature of the framework makes it a candidate to become an
‘‘open reference’’ for ISRM that can be widely used by enterprises seeking safe
environment for their e-based business. The authors hope that the time to be taken
toward the wide scale use of the framework will not be very long.
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